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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the effects of business cycle volatility on measures of subjective well-being,
including self-reported happiness and life satisfaction. I find robust evidence that high inflation and,
to a greater extent, unemployment lower perceived well-being. Greater macroeconomic volatility
also undermines well-being. These effects are moderate but important: eliminating unemployment
volatility would raise well-being by an amount roughly equal to that from lowering the average level
of unemployment by a quarter of a percentage point. The effects of inflation volatility on well-being
are less easy to detect and are likely smaller.
Justin Wolfers






1. Introduction: The Happiness Cost of Business Cycles
1 
 
The focus of macroeconomists on business cycle analysis presumably reflects a belief 
that macroeconomic fluctuations entail important consequences for the well-being of society.  
However, formal attempts to quantify these costs suggest that they may be small.  Lucas (1987) 
argues that business cycles present mainly a source of aggregate consumption risk that turns out 
to be of only second-order importance.  He estimates the cost of this risk to be equivalent to less 
than one-tenth of one percent of consumption. 
Yet both the general public and many economists continue to argue that smoothing the 
business cycle is an important objective.  For instance, Shiller (1997, p.36) reports that 80% of 
Americans agree with the statement that preventing recessions is “as important as preventing 
drug abuse or preventing deterioration in the quality of our schools”.  Of these, 83% endorse the 
importance of counter-cyclical policy even if “the method of preventing economic recessions had 
an absolutely equal impact on economic booms… preventing really good times just as much as it 
prevented really bad times.”  Professional economists surveyed by Shiller were as likely to agree 
with these two statements as the public.  (The corresponding proportions are 76% and 84%.) 
This paper treads a path between the approaches of Shiller and Lucas.  That is, I do not 
simply ask people whether they believe business cycles are costly.  Equally, I do not assume a 
preference structure and make inferences about the cost of business cycles.  Rather, I analyze 
data on subjective well-being, and compare the evolution of aggregate levels of self-reported 
happiness with macroeconomic conditions. 
All three of these approaches share a common theme: they explore the extent to which 
macroeconomic conditions interact with preferences—standard preferences, expressed 
preferences or experienced utility—to induce an aversion to business cycle volatility. 
In turn, this aversion to volatility can arise from several sources, although they all share a 
dependence on Jensen’s inequality: convexity in either preferences or economic structure drives 
a wedge between average well-being in a volatile macroeconomy and well-being experienced 
under average macroeconomic conditions.  As such, volatility undermines well-being. 
The macroeconomic data that I analyze is familiar to most readers, while the use of 
happiness data in macroeconomics is somewhat novel.  Thus, I start by introducing these data 
and outlining the existing literature in section two.  Section three establishes that both 
                                                 
1 Data and programs used in this paper are available at the author’s homepage: www.stanford.edu/people/jwolfers. 2 
unemployment and inflation lower well-being.  Section four further explores the effect of the 
business cycle on feelings in two national datasets.  Section five is the heart of the analysis, 
asking whether the data can speak to not only a preference for low unemployment and inflation, 
but also low volatility.  Section six concludes. 
To preview my findings, I find compelling evidence that unemployment and inflation 
both undermine well-being.  People are much more averse to unemployment than inflation, and 
even with a moderate sacrifice ratio, it is a close call as to whether disinflationary policies have 
raised or lowered well-being.  I find evidence that volatility in the real economy has important 
consequences.  Current levels of aggregate unemployment volatility probably reduce well-being 
by an amount equivalent to raising average unemployment by a quarter of a percentage point.  
While I find some suggestive evidence that inflation volatility is costly, the evidence on this 
point is less clear.  
 
 
2. Background: Subjective Well-being in Macroeconomics 
 
Analysis of subjective well-being remains somewhat on the periphery of modern 
economics, presumably reflecting the deep grounding of our discipline in revealed preference.  
Nonetheless, economic analysis of feelings may still be useful for at least three reasons.  First, 
feelings may enter directly into the utility function, and as such are an object of direct interest.  
Second, feelings may help predict behavior.  And third, it may be that asking people how they 
feel is a more direct way to do welfare economics than to make inferences based on their 
consumption patterns. 
Data on feelings of well-being are collected from several large-scale surveys that ask 
questions including the following: 
•  “Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days—would you say you’re 
very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy these days?” [Eurobarometer 1975-1986] 
•  “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied 
with the life you lead?” [Eurobarometer 1973-1998] 
•  “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are 
very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” [General Social Survey: 1972-1998] 
•  “Have you recently been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?” [British 
Household Panel Study: 1991-2000] 3 
While life satisfaction and happiness are somewhat different concepts, responses are 
highly correlated and hence these concepts are typically joined under the broader rubric of 
“subjective well-being”.  A host of validation studies have suggested that these questions reveal 
something meaningful and can indeed be interpreted as reflecting levels of well-being.  For 
instance, those who report being happier are typically rated by others as happier, and tend to 
smile and laugh more.  Self-reported happiness also correlates with both heart rate and electrical 
activity in the brain.  Measures of subjective well-being have relatively high test-retest 
correlations, similar microeconometric structure across time and space, and are highly correlated 
with related questions.  Diener (1984) provides a useful review of psychometric analysis of the 
validity of these data.  Bruno and Frey (2002) provide an interesting survey of recent happiness 
research within economics. 
In his seminal 1974 paper, Richard Easterlin asked whether economic growth led to 
rising happiness.  Analyzing time series data in both the US and Japan (where average incomes 
grew by a factor of two and six, respectively, since the war), he finds that raising the income of 
all does not raise the happiness of all.  Updates to this work in 1995 and 1996 confirm these 
results.  This is to be contrasted with the finding that within a society, those who are richer tend 
to report being happier.  Easterlin reconciles these two results by reference to Duesenberry’s 
(1949) relative income hypothesis: what matters is keeping up with the Joneses, and on average 
economic growth only makes you rich at the same rates as it does the Joneses.  This leads to not 
only a different concept of welfare (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978), but also presents a challenge 
to the efficacy of standard macroeconomic policy. 
However, the largest cross-national comparisons of happiness data—by Inglehart and 
Klingemann (2000) and Veenhoven (1997)—find that people in poor countries have much lower 
levels of self-reported happiness.  These authors argue that well-being is highly responsive to the 
satisfaction of basic needs, but almost invariant to income at higher levels of development. 
Finally, economic and political institutions also affect happiness, although it is an open 
question as to whether these effects are independent of macroeconomic conditions, or mediated 
by them.  Nonetheless, under this view, establishing the right institutional frameworks is the key 
to higher levels of happiness. 
This paper takes a closer look at the links between happiness and business-cycle variation 
in unemployment and inflation.  
 
 4 
3. Business Cycles and Happiness 
 
The most directly relevant analysis of happiness and the business cycle comes from 
di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001).  Analyzing a country-year panel, they find that life 
satisfaction declines with unemployment and inflation, controlling for country and year fixed 
effects.  Their work was based on an unbalanced panel of Eurobarometer survey data covering 
twelve European nations from 1975-1991.  My analysis uses the same survey, but updates it to 
cover sixteen countries running from 1973-98 (Schmitt and Scholz, 2002).  Thus, I start by 
updating these results in Table 1, as described below. 
The Eurobarometer happiness question (shown above) was asked only from 1975-86 
(excluding 1980 and 1981), while the life satisfaction question was asked every year from 1973-
98, except 1974 and 1996.  Overall, this yields an unbalanced panel of 504,581 valid responses 
to the life satisfaction question in 274 country-years, and 134,590 responses to the happiness 
question over 99 country-years.
2  Answers to the two questions are highly correlated, and so 
given the greater data availability, my analysis will focus on life satisfaction. 
An important technical issue relates to finding a sensible set of units with which to measure 
well-being.  As only qualitative indicators exist, there are no natural happiness units that 
immediately correspond with the textbook “util”.  Throughout this paper I analyze four 
alternatives: 
•  Following di Tella et. al, I simply take country-year averages of well-being, assigning a value 
of 1 to the lowest satisfaction category, and with each qualitative increment, add one.
3 
•  A less arbitrary alternative is simply to code up the proportion of the population who are 
“very satisfied” in each country in each year.  This has the disadvantage of effectively 
ignoring information from movements between “fairly satisfied” and “not very satisfied”, 
and also between “not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied”. 
•  A preferable alternative involves a two-stage procedure.  In the first stage, I run an ordered 
probit regression on a full set of dummy variables for each country in each year.  Under the 
assumption that well-being is an unobserved normally distributed variable within each 
country-year, this maximum likelihood procedure estimates the cut-points between different 
                                                 
2 Northern Ireland is included as part of the United Kingdom.  For consistency, I drop East Germany from the 
sample, and follow only West Germans. 
3 Thus, for the Eurobarometer survey: 1 = “not at all satisfied”; 2 = “not very satisfied”; 3= “fairly satisfied”; 4 = 
“very satisfied”. 5 
categorizations, thereby giving these data a more natural cardinalization.
4  That is, this 
regression estimates numerical values for each qualitative response that are most likely given 
the sample proportions in the data and the assumption that the true underlying distribution of 
happiness is normally distributed. 
The estimated country-year fixed effects capture shifts in the mean of the underlying 
distribution over time in each country.  Figure 1 shows how the mean of this estimated 
satisfaction index varies across countries and through time.  The chart also shows the 
proportion of the population who are very satisfied, and the two lines show close co-
movement. 
•  An analogous, but computationally more intensive, procedure involves simply estimating an 
ordered probit regression directly on the micro data (including as controls a full set of state 
and year fixed effects).  The intuition underlying this regression is essentially similar to that 
above.  Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level, and hence should be 
comparable to those estimated on the macro data.  These results are typically very similar to 
those derived using the two-step procedure described above. 
  
                                                 
4 Thus, this cardinalization derives explicitly from an identifying assumption that well-being is normally distributed 
in the population.  The estimates suggest that the difference between the median person who is “not at all satisfied” 
with their life and the median “not very” satisfied person is about two-thirds of the difference between the median in 
each of the “not very” and “somewhat” categories.  In turn, this is about the same as the difference between the 

















































































































Table 1 analyzes the relationship between measures of subjective well-being and annual 
measures of inflation and unemployment.
5  In each case, the regressions are of the form: 
t c, t c t c, t c, t c, ε   effects   fixed   year   and   country Inflation   π nt Unemployme   β ion  Satisfact Life + + + =  
Table 1: Well-being and Macroeconomic Conditions: Eurobarometer Survey 
  Panel A: Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction
(a) 
  Macro Data
   Micro  Data 














































State and year 
fixed effects 
9  9  9  9 
Adj. R
2(c)  .9326 .9237  .9341 .0645 




  Panel B: Effect on % “Very Satisfied” (Sample mean=28%) 
Unemploymentc,t  n.a. -1.1%
  -1.2% -1.1% 




* denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at country-year level) 
Each column reports a different regression with a different dependent variable: 
(1)  Average levels of happiness in each country-year (1= “not at all satisfied”; 2= “not very satisfied”; 3= 
“fairly satisfied”; 4 = “very satisfied”). 
(2)  Proportion of the population in a country-year who reported being “very satisfied” 
(3)  The dependent variable is the value of an estimated happiness index derived from an ordered probit 
regression of satisfaction on a full set of interacted country and year fixed effects. 
(4)  Ordered probit regression analyzing individual-level data on reported satisfaction. 
(a)  Micro data regressions use sample weights.  Macro regressions simple OLS (data constructed using weights). 
(b)  90% confidence interval on the unemployment-inflation tradeoff reflects the 10
th and 90
th percentile estimates 
from 1000 bootstrap replications. 
(c)  Adjusted R
2 in columns 1-3; Pseudo R
2 in column 4. 
 
Panel A reports the main regression results.  Each column shows a separate regression, and 
across all four columns, unemployment lowers subjective well-being.  This result is robust across 
                                                 
5 Unemployment and inflation data are from the OECD Economic Outlook.  While I simply report the coefficient on 
that year’s unemployment or inflation rate, di Tella et al use instead a three-year backward-looking average. 8 
specifications, and easily meets standard levels of statistical significance.  The effect of inflation 
on well-being is less statistically robust, but nonetheless, these data suggest that inflation lowers 
well-being.  Further regressions (not shown) confirm that responses to the happiness question 
yield a similar pattern of responses. 
Given that the dependent variable is qualitative in nature, one must take care in interpreting 
these magnitudes.  Columns 3 and 4 are interpretable roughly as “effect sizes”: the effects of 
macroeconomic variables on happiness are measured by scaling by the standard deviation of the 
happiness distribution.  Thus, if unemployment were to rise by 10 percentage points, average 
levels of happiness decline by about 0.35 standard deviations.  Figure 2 shows the intuition 
underlying these estimates.  
 
Figure 2 
Source: Author’s calculations based on results in column 4 of table 1. 
 
The bell curve A shows the (assumed) standard normal distribution of happiness in the 
population, and the estimated cut-points reflect the most likely categorization of respondents into 
“very”, “fairly”, “not very” or “not at all” satisfied with their life, given observed proportions in 
the data.  Unemployment shifts this distribution leftward, and curve B shows the distribution 
when unemployment is 10 percentage points higher.  Curve C shows this distribution if both 














Distribution of Happiness Under 3 Scenarios
Degree of satisfaction (~N(0,1))
 A. Unemp. & Infl. at ave. level  B. Raise U 10%-pts; infl unch.
 C. Raise U & Infl. 10%-pts






coefficients on unemployment and inflation of 3.5 and 0.7, these curves are shifted left 0.35 and 
a further 0.07 standard deviations, respectively.  To see that these are large effects, note that the 
median person in scenario B is as happy as the person at the 36th percentile in scenario A.  
Similarly, the median person in scenario C is as happy as the person at the 33rd percentile in the 
happiness distribution in scenario A. 
While Figure 2 provides a useful metric for interpreting the results specifically in column 
4, the scaling is also roughly similar for the results in column 3.  Panel B reports an alternative 
metric that is also comparable with results in the second column: changes in the predicted share 
of the population who are “very satisfied”.  (These are marginal effects, evaluated at the mean.)  
On average, 28% of the population is “very satisfied” with their lives.  Raising inflation by ten 
percentage points lowers this number by around two percentage points, while raising 
unemployment by ten percentage points lowers the proportion “very satisfied” by around twelve 
percentage points. 
The ratio of the coefficients on unemployment and inflation—shown in the third row—
gives some sense of how the public feels about the unemployment-inflation trade-off.  Whereas 
di Tella, Oswald and MacCulloch had found the public to be indifferent between raising 
unemployment for a year by one percentage point and raising inflation by 1.7 percentage points, 
this larger sample suggests that the inflation-unemployment trade-off is closer to five to one.  
That is, the public appears to be extremely averse to unemployment. 
These results can be used to speculate about the effects of disinflation on well-being.  
Feldstein (1997, p.123) has claimed a widespread professional consensus that inflation has 
important adverse effects and that “these adverse effects justify the sacrifices in employment and 
output that are generally needed to reduce inflation.”  These well-being data give a new way to 
evaluate these costs and benefits. 
Consider a central bank trying to decide whether to reduce inflation by one percentage 
point.  The costs of such a policy derive from estimates of the sacrifice ratio, often drawn from 
estimates of the slope of the short-run Phillips Curve.  These estimates suggest that the cost of 
such a policy is that unemployment must be kept above its equilibrium level by two percentage 
points for a year.  The benefits of this temporary contraction are assumed to be permanent, and 
hence assuming a discount rate of 6 percent, permanently reducing inflation by 1 percentage 
point has a present value equivalent to 16-percentage point-years of lower inflation.  Would the 
public be willing to trade 2 percent-years of higher unemployment for 16 percent-years of lower 
inflation? 10 
The preferences over inflation and unemployment described in Table 1 suggest that this 
is a close call.  If the effect on unemployment is temporary and the effect on inflation permanent, 
then disinflation probably enhances well-being.  However, if the rise in unemployment following 
a monetary contraction is not completely transitory (as suggested by Ball 1997 or Blanchard and 
Wolfers, 2000), or the decline in inflation is not completely persistent, then disinflation probably 
lowers well-being.  Indeed, the results in Table 1, when interpreted jointly with evidence of 
heterogeneous and persistent costs of disinflation (Ball 1994, Ball 1997) suggest that, for some 
countries, disinflation almost certainly undermines well-being. 
 
4. Further Evidence on Well-being and Unemployment 
 
Several other data sources shed additional light on the well-being costs of unemployment.  
In particular, the British Household Panel Survey allows one to draw a richer portrait.  This 
survey—similar in structure to the PSID—started tracking around 10,000 Britons in 1991.  Of 
particular note, each respondent was asked to submit to a psychological test each year.  This test, 
called the GHQ-12 (General Health Questionnaire), consists of a battery of twelve questions 
originally developed as a screening instrument for psychiatric illness, but increasingly used as an 
indicator of psycho-social well-being. 
Each of the GHQ-12 questions is shown in Table 2.  The first column also reports the 
proportion of respondents who state that their well-being on that particular measure is less than 
usual.
6  Typically, about 10-20% of the population exhibits each “symptom” on any specific 
question. 
These data were matched to regional unemployment data from both the labor force 
survey and claimant counts.  Unfortunately, consistent regional inflation indicators are not 
available.  In order to test for the influence of the business cycle on well-being, I ran ordered 
probit regressions of well-being on the regional unemployment rate, controlling for region and 
year fixed effects.  The second column of Table 2 shows results where the independent variable 
is the claimant count measure of unemployment, while the third column analyzes the survey 
measure.  The fourth and fifth columns report these estimates as marginal effects, showing the 
implied effect of higher unemployment on the share of people reporting that they are unwell. 
                                                 
6 Responses were recoded so that higher numbers denote greater well-being.  For questions regarding capabilities 
(A, C, D, G, H, L): 1 = much less; 2= less so; 3 = same as usual; 4 = more than usual.  For questions regarding 
limitations (B, E, F, I, K): 1 = much more; 2 = rather more; 3 = no more than usual; 4 = not at all.  11 
Table 2: Effects of Unemployment on Various Dimensions of Well-being: BHPS 




Reported as Effect Sizes: 
Change in well-being 
[~N(0,1)] 
Reported as Marginal Effects: 
Change in % reporting unwell
(a) 
























































































Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from a separate ordered probit regression, controlling for region and year fixed 
effects.  Columns 4 and 5 report marginal effects implied by the coefficients in columns 2 and 3, respectively. 
Sample includes the Scotland and Wales extension samples, but excludes the ECHP sub-sample, and hence includes no 
data for Northern Ireland.  Valid responses required all twelve questions to be answered, yielding 88,695 valid interviews 
from 14,752 respondents over ten years, in 120 region-year clusters. 
Weighted using sample weight xrwght.  
(a) “Unwell” equates to reporting well-being less than usual or much less than usual on a particular measure. 12 
 
  It is worth emphasizing that these results reflect aggregate movements.  Thus, the 
interpretation is that a rise in unemployment in a region lowers average feelings of usefulness, 
confidence and happiness, and raises depression and feelings of worthlessness in that region. 
  Finally, Table 3 turns to data from the US General Social Survey to show that state-
specific economic downturns also undermine happiness in the US.  I regress happiness on two 
alternative measures of state labor market conditions: the CPS unemployment rate, and a 
measure constructed as the deviation of (log) non-farm payrolls in that state from a Hodrick-
Prescott filtered state trend (described in Wolfers 2002).  As in the tables above, I show both the 
coefficients from an ordered probit, and the corresponding marginal effects.  In this case, the 
marginal effects shown are for the percent “very happy”. 
 13 
Table 3: Happiness and Unemployment Across US States: General Social Survey 
 Average    Estimated Coefficients 
 %  Very 
happy or 
very  
Reported as Effect Sizes: 
Change in happiness [~N(0,1)] 
  Marginal Effects: 
Change in % reporting 
 very happy
(a) 
  confident  Unemp. Rate  Emp. Gap  Unemp. Rate  Emp. Gap 
“Taken all together, how would you say things are these days would you say that you are [3] very 
happy, [2] pretty happy, or [1] not too happy?” 








I am going to name some institutions in this country.  As far as the people running these 
institutions are concerned, would you say you have [3] a great deal of confidence, [2] only some 
confidence, or [1] hardly any confidence at all in them? 
Executive branch 































































































Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from a separate ordered probit regression, controlling for state and year 
fixed effects.  Columns 4 and 5 report marginal effects implied by the coefficients in columns 2 and 3, respectively. 
Sample: GSS data for 1973-1998. n=36,146 valid interviews, in 773 state-year clusters for happiness; n=21,245 
valid responses to all confidence questions in 667 state-year clusters. 
***, 
**, 
* denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state-year level) 14 
 
  Beyond the effects on happiness, Table 3 also shows that economic downturns undermine 
public confidence in political and economic institutions.  Intriguingly, the effects on faith in large 
companies, banks and financial institutions and even education are larger than those on political 
institutions such as the President and Congress.
7 
 
5. Are People Averse to Economic Fluctuations? 
 
Results in the previous sections suggest that both inflation and unemployment undermine 
well-being, that these effects are reflected in many different domains, and that unemployment 
undermines public confidence in economic and political institutions.  In this section I turn to 
examining the effects of macroeconomic volatility on well-being.  The preceding results do not 
speak directly to this issue: it may be that the benefit of a boom exactly offsets the costs of a 
downturn, and hence the business cycle does not affect average levels of well-being.  Costs of 
macroeconomic volatility arise due to either convexity in the structure of the economy, or 
convexity in preferences.  Without this convexity, the gain to well-being in a boom offsets the 
loss in a recession. 
Examples of convexities in economic structure include non-linearities in the short-run 
Phillips curve (Debelle and Laxton, 1997), investment irreversibilities (Bernanke 1983), short-
run quasi-fixity in production (Ramey and Ramey 1991), and the choice of high-variance high-
return projects (Black, 1987).  Costs arising from convexity in the production side of the 
economy can be directly observed in macroeconomic data as reduced output or employment.
 8 
Examples of papers focusing on convexity in preferences are discussed below.  A 
common feature of these papers is that the welfare costs attributable to convex preferences are 
not immediately observable in macroeconomic data—one typically needs a well-specified 
welfare function in order to make any inferences. 
Lucas (1987) analyzes the costs of volatility due to imperfect insurance in a 
representative agent model.  He finds that aggregate consumption risk due to the business cycle 
undermines well-being by an amount roughly equivalent to one-tenth of a percent of the 
                                                 
7 Presumably this muted anger at Washington partly reflects the fact that these are responses to state unemployment 
relative to the national trend (recall that the regression controls for year fixed effects). 
8 Ramey and Ramey (1995) carefully examine the cross-country evidence, and find robust evidence that 
macroeconomic volatility undermines growth.  Specifically, a reduction in the volatility of output growth equal to 
one standard deviation of its cross-country variation translates into growth that is one-third of a percentage point 
higher in OECD countries. 15 
consumption of the representative agent.  Essentially he argues that aggregate consumption 
varies too little through the cycle to be of much concern. 
By analyzing a representative agent model, Lucas explicitly sidesteps the issue of 
idiosyncratic labor market risk.  While not denying the important of idiosyncratic risk, he argues 
that it reflects “the potential or actual gain from social insurance, not from stabilization policy.”  
Atkeson and Phelan (1994) address idiosyncratic risk directly.  They argue that the main source 
of idiosyncratic risk involves the risk of job loss. 
But to see why these effects may be small, consider a highly stylized model, drawing on 
Romer (1996, p. 415).  Consider the expected utility of a worker who faces the risk that her job is 
eliminated next period, which would cause her utility to shift from UE to UU.  In normal times the 
job destruction rate is s, but a recession may occur with probability p, raising the destruction rate 
to s+e; there is an equal likelihood of a boom that will reduce the firing rate to s-e.  Thus, the 
worker’s expected utility is: 
Expected Utility = p[(1-s-e)UE+(s+e)UU] + p[(1-s+e)UE+(s-e)UU]+(1-2p)[(1-s)UU+sUE] 
  = sUU + (1-s)UE 
The first term reflects recessions, the second term booms, and the third reflects times of 
calm.  Importantly, note that this simplifies to an expression in which expected utility is 
independent of both p and e – the likelihood and magnitude of a shock to the job destruction rate, 
respectively.  That is, dampening the business cycle has no immediate effect on average levels of 
well-being in this stylized example.  This result reflects the fact that expected utility is linear in 
probabilities. 
However, the risk of job loss is more highly correlated across individuals when shocks to 
the job destruction rate are either larger or more common.  That is, the probability that both a 
worker and her husband lose their jobs at the same time is higher when macroeconomic volatility 
is greater.  Consequently, the ability of husband and wife to insure each other against job loss 
declines with macroeconomic volatility, undermining average well-being.  This same logic 
extends to other forms of intra-temporal pooling of idiosyncratic risk.  (Formally, this arises 
because pooled income is not linear in the probability of job loss.) 
Romer (1996) notes that beyond consumption volatility, cyclical variability of hours 
worked is much larger than that of consumption, and this may pose major welfare costs.  A 
competitive labor market equilibrium achieves an efficient allocation.  Hence, recessions may 
drive the marginal rate of substitution between labor and leisure below the marginal product of 
labor; booms potentially cause the reverse misallocation, with the marginal product below the 16 
value of leisure.  These costs of volatility accrue even when imperfect competition yields an 
equilibrium in which employment is sub-optimally low.  Figure 3, adapted from Galí, Gertler 
and López-Salido (2002), shows that under imperfect competition, booms drive the economy 
toward the first best, while recessions drive the economy even further away from the optimum.  
Incrementally larger deviations from first best have an increasing welfare cost (the gap between 
the supply and demand curves widens), suggesting that recessions undermine well-being by 
more than equal-sized booms.  These three authors calibrate a model to infer this cost, arguing 





Finally, on the assumption that more volatile inflation is harder to forecast, aversion to 
inflation volatility can be motivated by reference to either the redistributive effects of 
unanticipated inflation, or to the effects of relative-price distortions resulting from staggered 
















































































































































While the common theme of these papers has been an attempt to infer effects on well-
being from an imposed preference structure, my point of departure is to treat these well-being 
costs of business cycle volatility as directly observable.  Thus, I now turn to examining whether 
volatility in unemployment and inflation undermines well-being, conditional on average levels of 
unemployment and inflation.
9  That is, in Table 4 I regress life satisfaction against the standard 
deviation of both unemployment and inflation over the past eight years, and also control for the 
mean levels of these indicators over the same period: 
t c, t c
7..t - t c, 7..t - t c,
7..t - t c, 7..t - t c, t c,
ε   effects   fixed   year   &   country
Inflation   Deviation    Standard Inflation   verage A  







                                                 
9 By controlling for levels of unemployment and inflation, I partial out those effects of volatility that are mediated 
by higher volatility causing worse macroeconomic outcomes. 18 
 Table 4: Life Satisfaction: Levels and Volatility of Inflation and Unemployment 
  Panel A: Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction
 
  Macro Data
   Micro  Data 
  Average 
Satisfaction 
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State and year 
fixed effects 
9  9  9  9 
Adj. R
2  .9328 .9259  .9363  .0650 




  Panel B: Effect on % “Very Satisfied” (Sample mean=28%) 
Mean unemp.  n.a. -1.7%  -1.7%  -2.0% 
SD unemp.   -0.7%  -0.5%  -0.8% 
Mean inflation   -0.3%  -0.4%  -0.4% 
SD inflation   -0.3%  -0.5%  -0.5% 
Notes: 
See notes to Table 1 
Each column shows results from a separate regression with a different dependent variable. 
For the 5 country-year observations with less than 8 years of inflation/unemployment data, standard deviation and 
mean of a smaller number of observations were used. 
 
The first row confirms that unemployment dramatically lowers well-being, while the 
second row shows that volatile unemployment also lowers well-being.  Reflecting statistical 
imprecision, the results on unemployment volatility are at best suggestive: the estimate is only 
statistically significant in the last regression, but the point estimate is relatively large and 
negative in all four specifications. 
The standard deviation of unemployment over an 8-year period averaged around 
1½ percentage points in my sample.  Thus, the results in the last two columns suggest that 
halving the standard deviation of unemployment shifts the well-being distribution to the right by 19 
around ¾%*2≈0.015 standard deviations, increasing the proportion of the population who are 
very satisfied by around 0.5 percentage points.  By comparison, the gains from reducing the 
average level of unemployment by one percentage point are much larger—shifting the well-
being distribution to the right by 1%*6≈0.06 standard deviations, and raising the percent very 
happy by 2 percentage points.  Combining these findings suggests that halving unemployment 
volatility yields gains in well-being approximately equal to those from reducing the 
unemployment rate by one-quarter of a percentage point. 
The inflation results are also interesting.  As in Table 1, higher average levels of inflation 
lower well-being.  Moreover, the fourth row suggests that there may be costs to inflation 
volatility, with two of the four estimates statistically significant.  There is insufficient precision 
in these reduced-form estimates to say much about the relative importance of stabilizing inflation 
versus unemployment. 
Rather than make indirect inferences about the shape of the well-being function, Table 5 
directly estimates the degree of convexity in preferences over inflation and unemployment.  
Thus, I repeat the analysis in Table 1, but also add quadratic terms in both inflation and 
unemployment.  (A quadratic functional form is easily motivated in terms of the imperfect 
competition model with linear labor supply and labor demand curves, as shown in Figure 3.
10) 
 
                                                 
10 Woodford (2001) provides detailed microfoundations for a welfare function that is quadratic in inflation and in the 
output gap. 20 
Table 5: Are Preferences Convex? 
  Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction 
  Macro Data
   Micro  Data 
  Average 
Satisfaction 

























































2  .9341 .9262  .9362  .0647 
Sample  274 274  274  n=504,581 
274 country-year 
clusters 
  Marginal Effects on % “Very Satisfied” (Sample mean=28%) 
Unemploymentc,t  (Holding inflation constant at sample mean of 6.5%) 
   At 0%  n.a. -0.2%  -0.1% -0.2% 
   At 7½%    -0.5%  -0.5%  -0.6% 
   At 15%   -0.9%  -1.1%  -1.1% 
Inflationc,t  (Holding unemployment constant at sample mean of 7.7%) 
   At 0%   -0.7%  -0.6%  -0.5% 
   At 7½%    -0.5%  -0.5%  -0.5% 
   At 15%    -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% 
Each column shows results from a separate regression. 
See notes to Table 1. 
 
All four specifications suggest that aggregate well-being is a nonlinear function of 
unemployment, and that this non-linearity is statistically significant; the results for inflation are 
less clear.  Figure 4 graphs these results, showing how well-being declines with unemployment 
and inflation, relative to a zero unemployment/inflation baseline. 
 21 
Figure 4 
Upper line = Costs of Inflation
















































































Wellbeing, Inflation and Unemployment
Inflation/Unemployment Rate, %







Source: Author’s calculations based on results in Column 4 of Table 5. 
 
Figure 4 provides clear evidence that increasing levels of unemployment do increasing 
harm to well-being.  The effects of inflation on well-being are close to linear, and in three of the 
four columns, a null of linearity cannot be rejected. 
Thus, these results suggest large gains to reducing output volatility, and little or no gain 
to reducing inflation volatility.  For instance, these results suggest that when unemployment is 
15%, the marginal effect of reducing unemployment on well-being is more than quadruples that 
when unemployment is 5%.  Consequently, if unemployment were to alternate between 5% and 
15%, the well-being gained during booms would be less than that lost during recessions.  Indeed, 
the average well-being in such an economy is equal to that in an economy with a constant 
unemployment rate of 11%. 
This simple exercise can be taken somewhat more seriously in order to illustrate the 
welfare cost of business cycles.  The quadratic preferences over inflation and unemployment 
shown above can be rewritten as preferences over the mean and variance of unemployment and 
inflation, respectively.  To see this, note that Table 5 suggests that expected well-being takes the 
following form: 22 
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This allows me to show the results in Table 5 as indifference curves defined over the 
mean and standard deviation of unemployment and inflation, respectively. 
Figure 5 
Middle line passes through sample means: U=7.7%, SD(U)=2.2%
























Indifference Curves: Level and Volatility of Unemployment
SD(Unemployment Rate)








Figure 5 clearly shows large gains from eliminating high levels of unemployment 
volatility.  However, while eliminating high levels of volatility is extremely valuable, 
diminishing returns set in rather quickly.  Table 6 shows some specific costs of business cycle 
volatility – essentially tracking the middle indifference curve.  These welfare costs are measured 
in units equivalent to the rise in average unemployment that would make workers indifferent 
between a specific level of volatility and eliminating the business cycle. 
Table 6: Welfare Costs of Business Cycle Volatility 
SD(Unemployment  Rate)  0.5% 1%  2% 2.2% 4%  8% 
Total Welfare Cost of Volatility 
(%-pts of higher unemployment) 
0.01 0.04 0.18 0.22 0.74 3.37 
δ(Welfare Cost)/ δ(SD of Unemployment)  0.04 0.09 0.18 0.20 0.38 1.02 
Source: Author’s calculations based on results in column 4 of Table 5 (or middle indifference curve in Figure 5). 
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For instance, if through adept macroeconomic management unemployment exhibits a 
standard deviation of 2.2% rather than 4%, then we can say that managing the cycle yields gains 
in well-being equivalent to those from lowering unemployment by 0.74-0.22≈half a percentage 
point.  Within my sample the within-country standard deviation of unemployment actually 
averages 2.2%.  It is quite clear that decreasing returns to smoothing the cycle have set in: the 
elimination of the remaining volatility would have an effect on well-being equivalent to lowering 
unemployment by only one-quarter of a percentage point (0.22, to be precise). 
Note that the estimate of the well-being cost of volatility derived from the coefficients in 
Table 4 was somewhat larger: those numbers suggested that one needs only to halve the standard 
deviation of unemployment to yield increases in well-being equivalent to decreasing the 
unemployment rate by a quarter of a percentage point.  The figure above offers a useful partial 
reconciliation.  The fact that the larger number was derived from a reduced-form estimate is 
crucial: an estimated coefficient reflects only local variation in the data.  Consequently, the 
estimated effect from Table 4 effectively extrapolates something close to the slope of a tangent 
to the indifference curve at the mean level of volatility, while the smaller estimate suggested here 
reflects the height of a secant to the y-axis. Given the curvature shown in the figure, it is clear 
that the slope of the tangent yields estimates of the total welfare effects of business cycle 
volatility that are too large.  (Alternatively compare the total welfare cost of volatility reported in 
the middle line of Table 6, and that implied by the slope – multiplying the top and bottom lines.) 
Finally, one can also use Table 6 to speculate as to the value of advances made by 
macroeconomic research.  Christina Romer (1986) has compiled comparable unemployment 
rates series for the periods before 1930 and after 1948, concluding that the standard deviation of 
US unemployment may have declined by 10%.  This corresponds to an effect on well-being 
roughly equivalent to reducing unemployment by one-twentieth of a percentage point. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Data on subjective well-being yield several important lessons for macroeconomists.  Both 
unemployment and inflation significantly undermine aggregate measures of life satisfaction, 
happiness, and associated measures of psycho-social well-being.  Feelings of depression and 
worthlessness rise with unemployment, and feelings of usefulness, confidence, happiness and 
satisfaction with life all fall.  Not surprisingly, the public’s faith in political institutions, and 
particularly the corporate sector, also declines. 24 
The relative size of the effects of well-being on inflation and unemployment suggests that 
disinflationary policies may have raised well-being in some countries, but lowered well-being in 
others.  It is a close enough call that the happiness effects of such a policy surely depend on 
country-specific circumstances. 
Whereas previous research has attempted to infer the costs of business cycle volatility by 
imposing utility or welfare functions, the evidence in this paper is based upon empirical 
observation of well-being.  I find evidence that unemployment volatility undermines well-being, 
while the evidence on inflation volatility is weaker, but suggestive.  In terms of the magnitudes 
of these effects, it appears that there are important returns to smoothing the business cycle, but 
that diminishing returns have set in.  Further efforts to tame the business cycle might increase 
well-being by an amount equivalent to reducing the unemployment rate by a quarter of a 
percentage point.  Is this large?  Compared with previous estimates, such as Lucas (1987), it is 
rather large.  Compared with the effects of structural labor market reform, though, it is quite 
small.  Regardless, compared with evidence from microeconometric happiness equations, this is 
an important gain—these data tend to suggest that factors like employment and marital status 
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